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The Chamber of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered its
judgment on the location of the maritime boundary between Canada and the
United States in the Gulf of Maine, on October 12, 1984.  Less than two
years before, after many years consideration, and an almost complete
failure of consensus during the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),1 the international community adopted the
text of Articles 74 and 83 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea.2  These two almost identically-worded articles provided the
formula for delimiting the maritime boundaries between States’ exclusive
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3. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, arts. 74, 83.
4. Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J.
246 (Oct. 12).
5. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb.
20).  
6. Id. at 23.
economic zones (EEZ) and continental shelves.  They provide, in part, as
follows:
The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone/continental shelf
between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected
by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in
order to achieve an equitable solution.3
The lack of any objective criteria, or indeed any indicators of utility to
those facing a maritime boundary delimitation, reflects the lack of
consensus that existed up until the adoption of these articles at the very end
of the negotiation process.  It also provided a unique opportunity to the ICJ
and other international tribunals to frame the construction of a significant
area of international law, largely without State interference.  It is difficult
to think of another area of international law since World War II where
international adjudication has had such a clear field in which to operate.
The Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in Gulf of Maine Area4 (Gulf
of Maine Case) was the first international maritime boundary case to be
decided after the adoption of the Law of the Sea Convention.  From the
handing down of that first major international maritime boundary
delimitation case post-UNCLOS III, over a dozen cases have considered
principles to apply to maritime delimitation.  This Article will consider the
principles that have emerged from those cases, examine to what extent
international courts and tribunals have acted effectively upon their
opportunity to define this area of law, and explore the impact of the Gulf
of Maine Case on the development of that jurisprudence.
II. THE DECLINE OF NATURAL PROLONGATION
Before the negotiation of the Law of the Sea Convention in 1982 and
after 1969, when the ICJ decided North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,5 the
ICJ regarded natural prolongation as of paramount concern to questions of
delimitation.6  It drew support from the notion that the continental shelf was
the natural prolongation, or undersea extension, of land territory, so in
delimiting the boundaries of each State’s shelf, they would only have to
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7. Id. at 31.
8. Id.
9. Anglo-French Channel (U.K. v. Fr.), 18 I.L.M. 397 (1979).  
10. Id. at 428.  The Court of Arbitration also noted that the more significant Norwegian
trough had been ignored in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case. Id. (referencing Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18)).
11. Anglo-French Channel (U.K. v. Fr.), 18 I.L.M. at 427. The Court of Arbitration
found such a circumstance in relation to the continental shelf between the Channel Islands
and Britain, where the court found that this portion of the shelf would be French, although
it might be regarded as the natural prolongation of the Channel Islands.  Id.
12. Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 46 (Feb. 24).
13. Id. at 47.
14. Id. at 49-58.
15. Id. at 59.
16. MALCOLM D.EVANS,RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES AND MARITIME DELIMITATION 109
(Ian Brownlie, ed., 1989).
allocate to each State the natural prolongation of its own territory.7  As if
to stress their point, the majority of the court expressly indicated that if the
natural prolongation of one State was closer to another State, then distance
would cease to be relevant in the delimitation of the shelf.8
Some of the difficulties with this approach to boundary delimitation
became evident in Anglo-French Channel Arbitration.9  There, the Court
of Arbitration had chosen to ignore the Hurd Deep (and Hurd Deep
Fracture Zone) as geomorphological features, preferring the view that the
faults did “not disrupt the essential unity of the continental shelf.”10
Natural prolongation was held no longer to be paramount, but rather “in
certain situations” subject to “equitable principles.”11
Since 1977, subsequent cases and developments at UNCLOS III have
greatly diminished the importance and relevance of natural prolongation as
a factor in delimitation cases and agreements.  In Continental Shelf
(Tunisia/Libya Case), the ICJ indicated that natural prolongation “would
not necessarily be sufficient, or even appropriate, in itself to determine the
precise extent of the rights” between States,12 and expressly rejected a
submission by Libya to the effect that one needed only to determine the
natural prolongation and follow the lines dictated by nature.13  Rather, after
a detailed review of the extensive geological and geomorphological
evidence submitted by both parties,14 the court concluded that natural
prolongation was inapplicable and that maritime delimitation ought to be
goal driven, or as the court put it: “the principles are subordinate to the
goal.”15  As Malcolm Evans has indicated, “the entire trend of the Tunisia/
Libya Case is to play down the role of natural prolongation within the
delimitation process.”16
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17. Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J.
246, 293 (Oct. 12).
18. Id. at 296.
19. Id.
20. Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Guinea v. Guinea-Bissau), 25 I.L.M. 251, 299-300
(1986).
21. Id. at 300.
22. Anglo-French Channel (U.K. v. Fr.), 18 I.L.M. 397 (1979).
23. Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13 (Jun. 3).
24. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18).
25. Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. at 36.
In the Gulf of Maine Case, the chamber also noted the decline in
importance of natural prolongation since the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases.17  Even more tellingly though, the Chamber indicated that
geographic adjacency better expressed the link between a State and its
submarine entitlements than natural prolongation, and that any boundary
drawn would be derived by operation of international law rather than
“physical fact,”18 although the chamber was quick to note that adjacency
itself was not to be the basis of title.19  In the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Case,
the Court of Arbitration said that natural prolongation since UNCLOS III
represented only one of two bases for title to maritime areas, the other
being distance.20  Further, in that case, it was held that natural prolongation
was not applicable to the delimitation because both States were adjacent to
the same continuous continental shelf.21
This last point is particularly significant in the context of the treatment
of geological features in other cases.  As previously noted, quite notable
features, such as the Hurd Deep,22 the Pelagian Block,23 and the Norwegian
Trench,24 on the seabed have been ignored in delimiting areas.  It would
appear then that without the presence of a major trench or some other
equally vast and significant submarine feature, natural prolongation will
have little role in delimiting the maritime boundaries.  This was expressly
spelled out by the ICJ in Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta Case).25  In that
case, the court stated:
The Court . . . considers that since the development of the law
enables a State to claim that the continental shelf appertaining to
it extends up to as far as 200 miles from its coast, whatever the
geological characteristics of the corresponding sea-bed and subsoil,
there is no reason to ascribe any role to geological or geophysical
factors within that distance either in verifying the legal title of the
States concerned or in proceeding to a delimitation as between
their claims.  This is especially clear where verification of the
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26. Id. at 35.
27. Delimitation of Maritime Areas between Canada and the French Republic (Can. v.
Fr.), 31 I.L.M. 1148 (1992).
28. Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. at 33.
29. Delimitation of Maritime Areas (Can. v. Fr.), 31 I.L.M. at 1165.
30. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 57.
31. See infra Part III (examining the rise of the importance of factors other than natural
prolongation).
validity of title is concerned, since, at least in so far as those areas
are situated at a distance under 200 miles from the coasts in
question, title depends solely on the distance from the coasts of the
claimant States of any areas of sea-bed claimed by way of con-
tinental shelf, and the geological or geomorphological characteris-
tics of those areas are completely immaterial.26
Clearly, in the eyes of the ICJ, distance has replaced natural prolonga-
tion as the basis for the delimitation of all offshore maritime zones, with the
exception of the portions of the continental shelf that may extend beyond
the 200 nautical mile line.  In 1992, in Delimitation of Maritime Areas
between Canada and the French Republic27 (St. Pierre and Miquelon
Case), the Court of Arbitration appointed for that dispute did not mention
natural prolongation in its initial discussion of how to approach a maritime
delimitation.  The court also cited with approval the Libya/Malta Case and
said that natural prolongation was becoming “more and more a complex
and juridical concept.”28  Furthermore, the court added that where a
common maritime boundary was to be delimited, the geology and
geomorphology of the seabed were of no relevance.29
One reason for the decline in the importance of natural prolongation in
the reasoning of international tribunals is the development of the EEZ.
From the mid-1970s, when the regime of the EEZ began to receive
widespread international acceptance, it permitted coastal States to assert
jurisdiction over the seabed out to 200 nautical miles, regardless of water
depth or other similar considerations, a circumstance still reflected in the
Law of the Sea Convention today.30  The regime of the continental shelf
therefore largely became an irrelevancy for all States save those few with
broad shelves that extended beyond 200 miles.  The growing pre-eminence
of the EEZ meant that natural prolongation, the basis of the continental
shelf, diminished in importance in boundary delimitation proceedings,
while factors associated with the EEZ became more and more central to the
determination of such proceedings. 31
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32. For example, Prosper Weil has provided a detailed analysis demonstrating the
bankruptcy of the utilization of natural prolongation in the delimitation of boundaries.
PROSPER WEIL, THE LAW OF MARITIME DELIMITATION—REFLECTIONS 25-45 (Maureen
MacGlashan trans., 1989).
33. J.R.V. PRESCOTT, THE MARITIME POLITICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE WORLD 111-13
(1985).  For example, in a survey that considered over forty delimitation agreements dating
from between 1950 and 1988, Gerard Tanja notes only the Australia-Indonesia boundary as
using geomorphological factors in its delimitation.  GERARD J. TANJA, THE LEGAL
DETERMINATION OF INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES 52 (1990).
34. The Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr. Mochtar, described the 1971 and 1972
delimitations as Indonesia being “taken to the cleaners.”  SASHA STEPAN, CREDIBILITY GAP:
AUSTRALIA AND THE TIMOR GAP TREATY 3 (1990).
35. Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. at 33.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 35-36. 
The decline of natural prolongation can also be traced outside the arena
of international tribunals.32  J.R.V. Prescott has noted that there are scarcely
any delimitation agreements between States that are influenced by
considerations of the geomorphology of the seabed at the expense of
geographical considerations.33  One exception is the delimitation of the
continental shelf boundary between Australia and Indonesia (negotiated in
the early 1970s), where the boundary follows the southern side of the
trough between the two countries.  Given subsequent Indonesian dissatis-
faction with the line,34 it would not appear to be an exception that is likely
to be followed.
Similarly, natural prolongation as a concept was of limited value at
UNCLOS III.  As the ICJ noted in the Libya/Malta Case,35 distance became
an additional and more important criteria for determining the extent of the
continental shelf, with natural prolongation being represented by the
complex Hedburg/Irish formula contained in Article 76 of the Law of the
Sea Convention, and then only to a limit of 350 miles or 100 miles beyond
the 2500 meter isobath.36  The deliberate vagueness of the formulae for the
delimitation of the continental shelf and the EEZ permitted the ICJ to limit
the relevance of natural prolongation.
The above reference in the Libya/Malta Case37 concerning the extended
continental shelf raises the question as to whether natural prolongation
might be restored to importance in delimiting the continental shelf beyond
200 nautical miles.  This could be done on the rationale that the physical
composition of the seabed and its undersea configuration are of direct
relevance in determining its extent.  Since the presence of continental
sediment is at least one of the possible means available to a State when
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38. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 76(8).  
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Treaty between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic
of Indonesia Establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone Boundary and Certain Seabed
Boundaries, Austl.-Indon., Mar. 14, 1997, 1997 A.T.N.I.F. 4; see also Treaty between the
Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand Establishing Certain
Exclusive Economic Zone Boundaries and Continental Shelf Boundaries, Austl.-N.Z., July
25, 2004, 2004 A.T.N.I.F. 1.
claiming an extended shelf, arguing the seabed is literally the natural
prolongation of the land may again become significant.
There are a number of factors which may militate against the limited
re-emergence of natural prolongation.  First, logically, this is an argument
that would usually only work for opposite rather than adjacent States.
Adjacent States rest on the same shelf, and attributing a particular spur or
protuberance to one neighbor over another is likely to be hotly disputed.
Second, there are far fewer potential extended continental shelf boundaries,
decreasing the opportunity for a court to adjudicate.  This is increased by
the uncertainty injected by the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf into the process.  Under Article 76(8) of the Law of the
Sea Convention, States asserting rights over an extended shelf must lodge
data with the Commission in support of their assertion.38  The Commission
may then respond to the data and make a recommendation on the evidence
in support of the claim.39  Without the Commission’s imprimatur, States
may be reluctant to delimit boundaries in respect of uncertain rights.
Further, in areas where a boundary may be disputed, the Commission has
determined it will not consider data where there is an international
dispute.40  This greatly militates against a resolution, as there are two
hurdles to overcome: (1) the determination of the shelf status; and (2) the
delimitation itself, both of which act as a deterrent to the other.  Third,
while there are few examples of negotiated maritime boundaries, those that




While natural prolongation has declined in importance in maritime
delimitation, other factors have increased in importance.  Chief among
these is geography, or more particularly, the geography of the immediate
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42. Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J.
246, 278 (Oct. 28).
43. See Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J.18, 34 (Feb. 24); see also
Delimitation of Maritime Areas between Canada and French Republic (Can. v. Fr.), 31
I.L.M. 1148, 1161 (1992).
44. Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J.
at 271.
45. Id.
46. Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. at 42.  The court stated: “The need
for the delimitation of areas of the continental shelf between the Parties can only arise within
the submarine region in which claims by them to the exercise of sovereign rights are legally
possible according to international law.”  Id.
47. See the dissenting judgment of Judge Oda and his discussion of the irrelevance of the
“hinterland.” Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. at 256.  This view was
subsequently adopted by the court when faced with another relative size of the landmasses
argument by Libya.  Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. at 40.  Similarly, land
area was held not to be a relevant factor in determining “maritime territory” in the Maritime
Boundary Arbitration between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. Maritime Boundary Arbitration
(Guinea v. Guinea-Bissau), 25 I.L.M. 251, 301 (1986). 
48. Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.),
1993 I.C.J. 38, 47 (Jun. 14).
area where the delimitation is to take place.  In fact, in the Gulf of Maine
Case, the chamber stated: 
The Chamber is, furthermore, convinced for the purposes of such
a delimitation operation as is here required, international law, as
will be shown below, does no more than lay down in general that
equitable criteria are to be applied, criteria which are what may be
properly called the geographical features of the area.42
In delimitation, a tribunal will first seek to establish the area in which
the delimitation is to take place and the geographical features within that
area that will impact upon the boundary under consideration.43  This has
proven problematic in some delimitations, as the parties have advocated
looking at wider or narrower areas, depending on whether it suited their
position before the court.  For example, in the Gulf of Maine Case, the
United States urged the chamber to look at the macrogeographical context
of the Gulf of Maine on the North American east coast,44 while Canada
stressed to the chamber it should look at the gulf as a discrete feature, not
as part of a coast extending thousands of miles.45  Similarly, in the
Tunisia/Libya Case, the ICJ considered only a limited area—where there
was overlap between the two States—as relevant to the delimitation,46 not
the totality of the coastline or land areas of the two States.47  In the case of
Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen,48
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49. Id.
50. See Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18 at 41; see also Maritime
Boundary Arbitration (Guinea v. Guinea-Bissau), 25 I.L.M. at 264-65.   
51. Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. at 50.
52. See, e.g., Arbitration between Government of State of Eritrea and Government of
Republic of Yemen, ¶ 131, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1999), http://www.pca-
cpa.org/upload/files/EY%20Phase%20II.PDF; Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago
Arbitration (Barb. v. Trin. & Tobago), ¶ 242, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006), http://www.pca-
cpa.org/upload/files/Final%20Award.pdf; Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions
between Qatar and Bahrain, 2001 I.C.J. 40, 104, 111 (Mar. 16); Land and Maritime
Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, 2002 I.C.J. 303, 442 (Oct. 10); Maritime
Delimitation in Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. at 60.
(Jan Mayen Case), the ICJ introduced another variation to this theme, when
it indicated a relevant area, but divided that area into three sectors for the
purposes of its analysis.49
While court practice seems to favor the use of the immediate area in
dispute rather than its broad geographical context, the ICJ has also
considered the macrogeographical context of different features.50  In the
Libya/Malta Case, the court expressly stated that it considered relevant the
location of Malta in the central Mediterranean, noting that it was “a minor
feature of the northern seaboard of the region in question, located
substantially to the south of the general direction” of the northern littoral.51
As such, in certain circumstances, it may be appropriate for an international
tribunal to consider the geography of the wider region around which the
delimitation is to take place.
Once the relevant area has been identified, the international tribunal
then has to assess the features that are present in the area, and the effect
they can be given in the delimitation.  Theoretically, all lands are to be
treated in the same fashion.  The ideal of this type of model is an
equidistance line.  However, as has been seen in the discussions dealing
with the development of delimitation principles over time, an equidistance
line can be disproportionately warped by the presence of a concave coast,
foreign islands close offshore of the littoral State, or an unusual peninsula
or embayment in the area to be delimited.
Over time, courts have been increasingly explicit in their use of an
equidistance line as a starting point for delimitation, once the relevant area
has been identified.  In the most recent cases, the court has typically
proceeded to test such a line to determine whether it meets the court’s
notions of equity, or should be varied as a result of other circumstances.52
This approach has the advantage of flexibility, while at the same time
giving some guidance as to the approximate location of the boundary.
However, it is wise to recall that this method is not an adoption of
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53. Colson notes that this approach’s “place in customary international law is yet to be
decided.”  David A. Colson, The Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Neighbour-
ing States, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 91, 100 (2003).
54. Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, 2002 I.C.J. 303 (Oct.
10).
55. Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, 2002 I.C.J. at 443
(quoting Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. at 47) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
56. Anglo-French Channel (U.K. v. Fr.), 18 I.L.M. 397 (1979).
equidistance in the face of the lack of consensus at UNCLOS III,53 as this
extract from Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and
Nigeria54 (Cameroon/Nigeria Case) demonstrates:
The Court will now consider whether there are circumstances
that might make it necessary to adjust this equidistance line in
order to achieve an equitable result.
As the Court stated in the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya/ Malta) case:
the equidistance method is not the only method applicable to
the present dispute, and it does not even have the benefit of a
presumption in its favour. Thus, under existing law, it must be
demonstrated that the equidistance method leads to an equitable
result in the case in question.
The Court is bound to stress in this connection that delimiting
with a concern to achieving an equitable result, as required by
current international law, is not the same as delimiting in equity.
The Court’s jurisprudence shows that, in disputes relating to mari-
time delimitation, equity is not a method of delimitation, but solely
an aim that should be borne in mind in effecting the delimitation.55
In practice, the courts and tribunals have chosen to view certain geo-
graphical formations and configurations as deserving of different treatment,
and the circumstances they have considered deserving will be considered
below.
1.  Islands-Reduced Effect
The impact on a median line of offshore islands held by another State can
be quite remarkable and examples in international law abound.  The best
known examples are those which have given rise to international litigation,
such as the Channel Islands in the Anglo-French Channel Arbitration,56 the
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57. Dodecanese in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. 3 (Sept.
11).
58. Delimitation of Maritime Areas between Canada and the French Republic (Can. v.
Fr.), 31 I.L.M. 1148 (1992).
59. PRESCOTT, supra note 33, at 342-43 (see the map of the region).
60. Id. at 331-33.
61. See STUART B. KAYE, THE TORRES STRAIT (1997). 
62. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 121.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See generally John M. Van Dyke & Robert A. Brooks, Uninhabited Islands: Their
Impact on the Ownership of the Oceans’ Resources, 12 OCEAN DEV. & INT’LL. 265 (1983);
Christopher C. Joyner, The Exclusive Economic Zone and Antarctica: The Dilemmas of
Non-Sovereign Jurisdiction, 19 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 469, 476-77 (1988); Monte
Confurco (Sey. v. Fr.), I.T.L.O.S. (Dec. 18, 2001) (Vukas, J. declaration), http://www.itlos.
org/case_documents/2001/document_en_108.pdf; Volga (Russ. v. Austl.), I.T.L.O.S. (Dec.
23, 2002), http://www.itlos.org/case_documents/2002/document_en_216.pdf.
66. Maritime Delimitation in Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.),
1993 I.C.J. 38, 73-74 (Jun. 14).
Dodecanese in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf 57 (Aegean Sea Continental
Shelf Case), and the French islands off the coast of Newfoundland in
Delimitation of Maritime Areas between Canada and the French Republic58
(St. Pierre and Miquelon Case).  These are by no means the only examples,
with a number of instances in the West Indies,59 the impact on Cameroon’s
EEZ of the Equatorial Guinean island of Fernando Poo,60 and the
Australian islands in Torres Strait just off the coast of Papua New Guinea.61
Article 121 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention deals with the
question of islands.  It defines an island as “any naturally formed area of
land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide,”62 and
provides that all such formations generate a full territorial sea and
contiguous zone.63  An island may also generate a full EEZ and continental
shelf if it can sustain human habitation or an economic life of its own.64
While the definitions of “human habitation” and “economic life of [its]
own” have occasioned some debate amongst publicists, particularly in the
context of formations in the Antarctic,65 it is clear that small but
permanently inhabited islands are entitled to a full EEZ.  This includes
islands occupied only by research scientists and their support staff, without
any indigenous population, as confirmed by the ICJ in the Jan Mayen
Case.66  This full entitlement can create the inequity alluded to above,
where an island lies close offshore to another State.  To remedy the
inequity, the ICJ and other international tribunals have developed
techniques to negate or diminish the effect of such islands.
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67. Anglo-French Channel (U.K. v. Fr.), 18 I.L.M. 397 (1979).
68. Id. at 455.
69. The chamber chose to give Seal Island, south of Nova Scotia, half effect as it thought
the island too significant a feature to ignore, while to give it full effect would have been
“excessive.”  Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 246, 336-337 (Oct. 12).
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The most common method used by the ICJ, and for that matter in
delimitation agreements, is to reduce the effect of the islands on the median
line.  This was done by the Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-French
Channel Arbitration in respect of the Scilly Isles.67 These islands,
inhabited, and therefore at international law entitled to generate a
continental shelf, were given only half effect as opposed to the French
mainland.68  Other examples of half, or reduced effect for islands can be
seen in the treatment of Seal Island by the Chamber of the ICJ in the Gulf
of Maine Case,69 the St. Pierre and Miquelon Case where the Court of
Arbitration reduced the impact of those two islands as against the
Newfoundland coast,70 Qit’at Jaradah in the Qatar/Bahrain Case,71 and
Alcatraz Island in the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Case.72  In a variant on the
theme in the Tunisia/Libya Case, the Kerkennah Islands off the coast of
Tunisia were not given any effect by the ICJ, but the baseline used by the
court to represent the Tunisian coast was deliberately angled out into the
Mediterranean.  The court indicated the baseline was derived by calculating
the median of the lines representing the general direction of the coast, and
the direction of the Kerkennah Islands if drawn from the same point of
origin.73  As such, the Kerkennah Islands, themselves, were not given any
effect, but they did increase the effect of their mainland State’s coastal
areas.
A somewhat different approach was taken in the Maritime Delimitation
of Eritria and Yemen,74 (Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration) where the relevant area
contained numerous small islands. The Dahlaks, described as a “‘carpet’ of
islands” extending from the mainland coast, which were heavily populated,
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were given effect from the western basepoints of the group in the
calculation of an equidistance line,75 while the small barren and relatively
isolated islands of Jabal al-Tayr and the Zubayr Group were given no
effect.76  The much larger and populated island of Kamaran, and fringing
islands to its north were given effect as well.77  This is suggestive that
fringing islands78 and other features which are strongly associated with the
coastal State through the presence of a significant population, will increase
the likelihood of full effect being given.79
2.  Islands-Enclaving
Another solution for the dealing with offshore islands is to enclave the
islands’ maritime zones within those of the coastal State.  In this way, the
coastal State does not have its maritime areas divided by those of the
islands. Enclaving also limits the disproportionate impact of relatively
small features.
Again, the best example of this practice is in the Anglo-French Channel
Arbitration.  The Channel Islands, because of their proximity to the French
coast, and the marked extension of the British continental shelf that would
result from the use of a median line, were enclaved within the French
continental shelf, only receiving a twelve nautical mile zone.80  This, the
Court of Arbitration noted, preserved the unity of the French continental
shelf both north and south of the islands, while not completely depriving
the Channel Islands of at least some maritime areas.81
Similar arrangements have been found in other agreements and
arbitrations.  In the St. Pierre and Miquelon Case, the French islands of the
same name are enclaved within the Canadian EEZ.  The absence of another
opposite State, as in the Anglo-French Channel Arbitration, means that
while the enclaved zone extends out 200 nautical miles, it does not reach
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the high seas.82  The Torres Strait Treaty also uses this technique with the
Australian islands north of the seabed jurisdiction by having their
continental shelves enclaved within that of Papua New Guinea.83
3.  Mainland Geographical Features
Aside from islands, other geographical features can be of great rele-
vance in the delimitation of maritime zones.  The treatment of different
features will naturally vary depending upon the circumstances,84 so it is
difficult to provide any clear set of rules or guidelines to determine when
a particular formation will be treated in an exceptional fashion by a
tribunal.85  Some of the examples used in earlier cases will be examined
below to provide limited assistance in the absence of any formal
methodology.
The most useful point to make is that the courts continue to return to
their delimitation touchstone: an equitable result.  A feature will be used by
a court if the results are equitable.  While the geographic features in an area
provide the elements of the delimitation, ultimately the result determines
the relative importance and utility of those features.  This result-driven
approach is borne out by the statements of the ICJ in the Tunisia/Libya
Case:
It is . . . the result which is predominant; the principles are
subordinate to the goal.  The equitableness of a principle must be
assessed in the light of its usefulness for the purpose of arriving at
an equitable result.  It is not every such principle which is in itself
equitable; it may acquire this quality by reference to the equitable-
ness of the solution. The principles to be indicated by the Court
have to be selected according to their appropriateness for reaching
an equitable result.86
Looking at situations demonstrating this approach, the general shape
of the coastline in an area may be of relevance.  The court in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases fixed upon the concavity of the West German
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coast, and the impact this concavity would have on an equidistance line.
The court felt an equidistance line would produce an inequitable result
under the circumstances, and held the general direction of the coastline to
be sufficient grounds to justify the non-application of any equidistance
line.87
The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases are by no means the only
example of the use of the general direction of the coast to justify some
change in a boundary.  The chamber in the Gulf of Maine Case faced
arguments from both the United States and Canada urging it to treat
features such as the peninsulas of Nova Scotia88 and Cape Cod89 as
aberrations in the coastline.  In the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Case, the Court
of Arbitration felt obliged to draw upon the general direction of the
coastlines of the interested States and other States in the West African
region.90
In the Libya/Malta Case, the court stated it was adjusting the notional
median line between the two States northwards.91  The reasons given were
the disparity between the lengths of coasts under consideration, the placing
of basepoints governing any equidistance line, and the general geographical
context.92  This produced a line which was described by the Court as
“equitable, taking into account all relevant circumstances.”93  On the other
hand, the disparity in the coastal length ratio and the relevant areas was not
sufficient to obtain an adjustment in the boundary in the Qatar/Bahrain
Case.94
While it was stated earlier that there has been little guidance as to the
methodology of the ICJ’s approach to maritime delimitation, an outline of
the court’s practice has become evident in the cases.   Although the median
line will, in many cases, be manifestly inequitable, it seems that an
equidistance line will at least be the starting point of the court’s analysis in
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any case.95  The line will then be “tested” to see if it possesses the essential,
but elusive, “equitable” nature the court requires.  If it is equitable, it may
remain,96 but if it is inequitable the court will alter its path until it is so.
The adjustment may be a lateral transformation of the line towards one
state,97 reducing the effect of a formation,98 or a complete alteration ab
initio of the line.99
Ultimately, as already stated above, the crucial factor is the equitable
nature of the result.  To quote the chamber in the Gulf of Maine Case:
The fundamental rule of general international law governing
maritime delimitations, the rule which provided the Chamber with
its starting-point for the reasoning so far followed, requires that the
delimitation line be established while applying equitable criteria to
that operation, with a view to reaching an equitable result.100
Notably, the chamber also stated that in the context of the delimitation
within the Gulf of Maine:
 [I]t would scarcely be possible to assess the equitable
character of the delimitation there carried out on the basis of any
other than the predominant parameters provided by the physical
and political geography of the area.  And it is precisely those
parameters which served the Chamber as a guide in determining
the parts of the line which are to take effect in this portion of the
delimitation area.101
In these two passages, the chamber of the ICJ presents the guidelines
for the treatment of geographic features.  The result is to be equitable, and
geographic factors are to be the predominant input into ensuring that the
result is in fact equitable.
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4.  Coastal Length
The ICJ has occasionally averred to the relevance of relative coastal
lengths in maritime delimitation.  The court has generally been mindful to
stress that comparing the length of the coasts of the States seeking to
delimit a maritime boundary will not be a factor in deciding where the
boundary is to go.102
However, the court has made use of coastal lengths in a different
context.  While professing that coastal length will not be a factor in mari-
time delimitation, the ICJ has been happy to use the relative coastal lengths
to confirm that its delimitation is essentially equitable.  Coastal lengths
have therefore been used as a test in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases,103 the Tunisia/Libya Case,104 the Gulf of Maine Case,105 the
Libya/Malta Case,106 the Cameroon/Nigeria Case,107 and the Arbitration
between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago,108 to ensure
that an equitable boundary has been produced.  The same test was also
adapted and applied by the Court of Arbitration in the St. Pierre and
Miquelon Case to test the solution reached by the court.109
This use of coastal lengths as a test begs the question of its relevance
as a factor in delimitation.  It is certainly possible that the ICJ’s solution to
any delimitation question is made keeping a “weather eye” on the relative
coastal lengths of the State parties to ensure that the ultimate result can be
demonstrated to be an equitable one.110  Nevertheless, while one can
entertain suspicions as to the influence that relative coastal lengths might
have upon a court’s delimitation, the court has generally denied any such
influence.  Accordingly, relative coastal lengths must not be treated as a
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relevant consideration.111  However, the Jan Mayen Case may have
produced some modification of the ICJ’s admitted view of coastal
lengths.112  In that case, there was a nine to one ratio in coastal lengths
between the relevant portions of Greenland and Jan Mayen.113  The court
used this disparity as a justification for the shifting of the delimitation line
eastwards towards Jan Mayen.114
While it appears that in the Jan Mayen Case the court chose to apply
its test of the equitable nature to the median line in the style of previous
decisions, there is a point of difference.  Rather than being applied as a
confirmation of a solution, the ICJ in the Jan Mayen Case is using coastal
length as a basis for the formulation of the boundary.115  Further, although
coastal length did force the boundary eastwards, the ultimate line still does
not reflect, even approximately, the relevant coastal lengths of the two
islands.116  As such, coastal length was a “factor”117 in the formulation of
a line, but coastal length was not used to test the equitable nature of the
ultimate solution.  The ICJ may, therefore, finally be moving towards the
explicit recognition of coastal length as a relevant consideration, although
this proposition would certainly need to be tested in future cases before the
court.
B.  Economic Factors
The ICJ has been asked in a number of cases to deal with economic
factors as relevant to the delimitation of maritime boundaries between
States.  Two types of economic-based arguments have been made to the
court, and, given that each is distinct, they are dealt with separately. 
The first argument is that where there is an economic disparity between
the parties involved in the delimitation, the boundary should, after
accounting for all other factors, be placed in a more favourable position for
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the “poorer” State.  In this way, presumably, the weaker economic State
receives a greater share of the potential resources because it has a more
pressing need for them.
The ICJ has persistently rejected such an argument.  When first raised
in the Tunisia/Libya Case by Tunisia, the court stated it was:
. . . of the view that these economic considerations cannot be
taken into account for the delimitation of the continental shelf
areas appertaining to each Party.  They are virtually extraneous
factors since they are variables which unpredictable national
fortune or calamity, as the case may be, might any time cause to tilt
the scale one way or the other.118
This initial rejection has been reinforced in the cases since 1982.  The
tribunal in the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Case expressly cited the above
quoted paragraph with approval when dismissing the claims of both Guinea
and Guinea-Bissau that were both based on their economic needs as
developing countries.119  In the Gulf of Maine Case, the chamber preferred
geography to any other factors, including economic considerations.120  In
the Libya/Malta Case, the ICJ indicated explicitly that the economic
standing of the affected States was not a relevant consideration in any
maritime delimitation.121  However, in the Jan Mayen Case, the ICJ
rejected an argument put forward by Denmark that Greenland should be
entitled to a greater proportion of the delimitation area because Jan Mayen
had no indigenous population, no local industry, and was far smaller than
that of even the sparsely inhabited eastern coast of the huge island.122  The
court expressly stated that neither population nor socio-economic factors
were circumstances to be taken into account.123
The second argument based on economic factors concerns the
economic dependence of one or both States on the seabed or water column
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of the area to be delimited.  As a relevant consideration, this argument has
received a more sympathetic hearing from international tribunals.  The
economic importance of the mid-channel route to French ports was noted
by the Court of Arbitration as being a point stressed by France in the
Anglo-French Channel Arbitration.124  While the court there did not
expressly deal with this argument, it did accept that France had established
that there were special circumstances to justify a non-equidistance
solution.125
However, such factors have not always been considered to be of great
importance in a maritime delimitation.  The historic fishing rights of
Tunisian fishermen were considered by the ICJ in the Tunisia/Libya Case.
The court ultimately found it did not have to determine whether the areas
fished over time by Tunisian nationals affected the boundary, as the areas
were all on the Tunisian side of the line.126  However, the court did indicate
that perhaps notions of “historic rights” were more appropriately appraised
with the concept of an EEZ, but that in the case before them “other
considerations [were] governing.”127  Evans suggests that the place of such
“historic rights” is best assessed as the provision of yet another factor to
test the equitable nature of the boundary ultimately delimited.128  This
conclusion draws support from the chamber in the Gulf of Maine Case, in
the wider context of historic and recent economic activity.129  The impact
of economic activity on a delimitation was expressly stated by the chamber
in the following terms: 
It is, therefore, in the Chamber’s view, evident that the
respective scale of activities connected with fishing—or
navigation, defence or, for that matter, petroleum exploration and
exploitation—cannot be taken into account as a relevant circum-
stance or, if the term is preferred, as an equitable criterion to be
applied in determining the delimitation line.  What the Chamber
would regard as a legitimate scruple lies rather in concern lest the
overall result, even though achieved through the application of
equitable criteria and the use of appropriate methods for giving
them concrete effect, should unexpectedly be revealed as radically
inequitable, that is to say, as likely to entail catastrophic reper-
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cussions for the livelihood and economic well-being of the popula-
tion of the countries concerned.130
This relatively harsh position may have started to moderate in the Jan
Mayen Case.  In that case, the ICJ considered the effect on access to the
capelin fishery between Greenland and Jan Mayen that a median line would
have on the people of Eastern Greenland.131  Evidence had been presented
to the court that the Greenlanders were economically dependent on the
fishery and similar evidence was presented by Norway in relation to its
fishing communities.132  After reviewing the extent of the capelin fishery,
the court stated that “[i]t appears however . . . that the median line is too far
to the west for Denmark to be assured of an equitable access to the capelin
stock. . . . For this reason also the median line thus requires to be adjusted
or shifted eastwards.”133  As such, an economic consideration was per-
ceived by the court to be a significant factor in the adjustment of the
boundary.  Admittedly, the court had first considered geographical factors,
and had found other reasons for shifting the line to the east, but the court
still regarded the economic considerations as sufficiently important to be
an influence on the boundary’s ultimate course.
The boundary will not necessarily be affected by economic factors
where both parties’ nationals are equally dependent upon an economic
resource.  In the Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration, the tribunal held that because
both sides were affected by the presence of fish stocks in the area of the
Red Sea in issue, the boundary would not be altered to take the fish stocks
into account.134  The tribunal stated that it:
. . . finds no significant reason on any other grounds concern-
ing fishing—whether related to the historical practice of fishing in
general, to matters of asserted economic dependency on fishing, to
the location of fishing grounds, or to the patterns of fish consump-
tion by the populations—for accepting, or rejecting, the arguments
of either Party on the line of delimitation proposed by itself or by
the other Party.  Neither Party has succeeded in demonstrating that
the line of delimitation proposed by the other would produce a
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catastrophic or inequitable effect on the fishing activity of its
nationals or detrimental effects on fishing communities and
economic dislocation of its nationals. . . . For these reasons, it is
not possible for the Tribunal to accept or reject the line of delimita-
tion proposed by either Party on fisheries grounds. Nor can the
Tribunal find any relevant effect on the legal reasons supporting its
own selection of a delimitation line arising from its consideration
of the general past fishing practice of either Party or the potential
deprivation of fishing areas or access to fishing resources, or
arising from nutritional or other grounds.135
This is suggestive that existing economic factors only become relevant
where there would be substantial dislocation to only one of the parties
through the loss of access to important resources, and that the result in the
Jan Mayen Case should be treated as exceptional.136
C.  Geology and Geomorphology
Geology and geomorphology, in the context of the seabed, are the
studies of the structure and form of the seabed.  Potentially, following the
judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, with the stressing of
natural prolongation, both geology and geomorphology could have been of
paramount importance.  Geological factors would have been of importance
in identifying which areas of the continental shelf were the natural
prolongation of the littoral State, while geomorphological data could also
have been used to identify points dividing natural prolongations of a
continental shelf.
As already noted above, natural prolongation has not proved to be the
touchstone of maritime delimitation, and this is reflected in the treatment
of geological and geomorphological evidence in a number of more recent
cases.  While swamped with such data in the Tunisia/Libya Case, the ICJ
did not consider any of the material of relevance in its delimitation.137
Similarly, in the Gulf of Maine Case, geology was held not to be relevant
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under the circumstances,138 and geomorphology was treated likewise, given
that the Northeast Channel was not deemed significant enough to influence
the ultimate course of the boundary.139
It is clear the geomorphological and geological factors have not been
of great assistance in the delimiting of boundaries in cases before inter-
national tribunals.  However, none of the recent cases have involved the
delimitation of a continental shelf boundary in an area with a geomor-
phological feature of such vast significance that a court would have great
difficulty not taking note of it.140  However, given the comments, as noted
above, by the ICJ in the Malta/Libya Case concerning the relevance of
seabed data within 200 nautical miles of the coast,141 it seems unlikely that
geology or geomorphology will be of much assistance in the delimitation
of the continental shelf within that distance.  
D.  Political Factors
One factor that has proved relevant in at least some situations is the
political status of the territories between which the boundary is to run.  In
the Anglo-French Channel Arbitration, one reason why the boundary
delimited by the Court of Arbitration reduced the effect of the Channel
Islands was because they were not an independent sovereign State.142  As
they were only a dependency of Great Britain,143 they could not receive the
same entitlement to a continental shelf as metropolitan France.  The same
principle was implied by the ICJ in the Libya/Malta Case.  There, the court
indicated that had Malta not been a sovereign State, the boundary would
have been pushed further north, in favor of Libya.144
However, the principle may not always operate, and political factors
have not been in evidence in more contemporary cases.  In the St Pierre
and Miquelon Case, the tiny French colonial islands lay just offshore of the
Canadian province of Newfoundland.  Despite the fact that Newfoundland
had been an independent dominion prior to 1948 and was a full and equal
participant in the Dominion of Canada, the Court of Arbitration
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distinguished the Anglo-French Channel Arbitration, noting that New-
foundland was merely a Canadian island; therefore, it  was no different than
St. Pierre or Miquelon, which were French islands.145  The court also held
that the ICJ in the Libya/Malta Case had suggested “equality of treatment,
rather than diminished treatment for politically dependent islands,”146
which must be reckoned a strange interpretation.  Not surprisingly, this was
a finding criticized in the dissenting judgment of the Canadian ad hoc
judge.147  It is submitted that in its interpretation of the Anglo-French
Channel Arbitration and the Libya/Malta Case, the decision of the majority
in the St Pierre and Miquelon Case was probably not an accurate one, and
the judgment may be distinguished by further tribunals in the future.148
In summary, political status may be a factor in justifying the effect that
a particular piece of territory may have in any delimitation.  However, it is
clear that a tribunal may be most selective in exactly how it wishes to
categorize a particular area.  Therefore, it cannot be stated with certainty
whether political status would have an impact on a maritime boundary
delimitation.   
E.  Other Considerations
There are a number of other factors that may be relevant in the charting
of any boundary delimitation, although these do not fall neatly into clear
categories.  Each is dealt with below.
The position of the land boundary between the States involved in the
maritime delimitation may be of some importance in that delimitation.
While it is unusual for delimitation treaties merely to continue the land
boundary into the sea (as a technique in delimitation, the ICJ has expressly
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rejected this method as far too arbitrary),149 the location of the land
boundary itself must be relevant if it is used as the starting point for a
complete delimitation of the territorial sea as well as the continental shelf
and EEZ.150  Beyond providing the court with a starting point, the land
boundary appears to be of little import.151  The presence of a pre-existing
maritime boundary might also be a relevant consideration, although not one
explored to any great extent by international tribunals.  To some degree, the
question overlaps with the issue of a single maritime boundary for the
continental shelf and the EEZ. 152
State practice with regard to other boundaries has been the subject of
ICJ consideration.  In the Jan Mayen Case, the question of the relevance of
other maritime delimitation agreements entered into by the parties and
internal legislation was raised.153  After examining the agreements and
legislation of the parties, the court chose not to use it in determining the
appropriate boundary.154  The implication of the court appears to be that
unless state practice clearly relates to the specific boundary in question, it
will not be a factor in its deliberations.155
While geological factors do not appear to be of great utility in the
current state of international maritime boundary delimitation, this is not
strictly true of one geology-based consideration.  The position and size of
deposits of valuable oil and/or minerals have been deemed a relevant factor
by the ICJ.156  In the Libya/Malta Case, the ICJ confirmed this by stating
that “the natural resources of the continental shelf under delimitation ‘so
far as known or readily ascertainable’ might well constitute relevant
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circumstances which it would be reasonable to take into account in a
delimitation.”157  Given this, it is unlikely that a court will be prepared to
alter a boundary to preserve the unity of anything but a known deposit.158
Security is another factor that has figured into a number of decisions.
As noted above, in the Anglo-French Channel Arbitration, France pleaded
its security interests as a legitimate reason for the enclaving of the Channel
Islands.  The Court of Arbitration in that case did not clarify whether
security was decisive in its adoption of much of the French position, but
certainly it did appear to be relevant to the court.
However, in subsequent cases before the ICJ, advocates of security as
an important factor in maritime delimitation have not been successful.  In
the Libya/Malta Case, the court chose to ignore Maltese submissions that
the location of the boundary should take into account the potential threat
to the security of that State.159  A similar argument by Norway in the Jan
Mayen Case saw the ICJ respond by quoting the previously cited portion
of the Libya/Malta Case, and indicating that the same result should be
reached for Jan Mayen.160
From these two cases, the ICJ has indicated that where a significant
distance exists between two States, the security concerns of one will not
affect the location of the boundary between them.  The logic in such an
approach is obvious.  As the twentieth century has progressed, technology
has permitted States to hurl deadly force greater and greater distances, and
is now to the extent that if the old cannon shot rule were still in operation
and applied to the intercontinental ballistic missile, all seas would be part
of the territorial sea.  It therefore makes little sense to alter a maritime
boundary ten or even twenty miles when such a distance could only
represent an additional five minutes flight of a helicopter, and far less for
a jet fighter or missile.  Technological development has removed much of
the relevancy from security as a consideration in boundary delimitation.  
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IV. CONCLUSION
There is little doubt that geographic factors are regarded as of
fundamental importance in the drawing of any maritime delimitation line.
The ICJ and other international tribunals have fixed upon notions of an
equitable solution to boundary delimitation, largely derived through an
analysis of the geography of the area adjacent to the dispute, and to a lesser
extent the geographic context in which the delimitation is to take place.
Other factors, while tangentially relevant, at least so far as the courts still
pay them lip service, are now increasingly overlooked, and appear to be of
diminishing value.  Certainly within 200 nautical miles of any coastline,
where the largest proportions of delimitations have taken place and are to
take place in the future, geographic factors are of paramount importance.161
The decision of the chamber in the Gulf of Maine Case occupies a
significant position in the development of international maritime boundary
delimitation.  Its significance comes not merely from the matters discussed
by the chamber in the case and their influence and precedent value in other
cases,162 but in the fact that the case marked the first decision of an
international tribunal since the adoption of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea.  With a largely blank canvas to work, given the lack
of meaningful assistance in the texts of Articles 76 and 83, the ICJ and
other international tribunals have sought to clarify the rules pertaining to
maritime delimitation, albeit with mixed success.
